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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 06/02/2008 Accident number: 554 
Accident time: 11:33 Accident Date: 26/11/2006 
Where it occurred: Task # 193, Haji 




Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Tripwire accident Date of main report: 03/12/2006 
ID original source: OPS/03/01-24 Name of source: UNMACA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: POMZ AP frag Ground condition: dry/dusty 
soft 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 06/02/2008 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: WGS 84 Coordinates fixed by: GPS 
Map east: E 065 55 05.2 Map north: N 31 22 53.9 
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate training (?) 
mechanical follow-up (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
use of shovel (?) 




The report of this accident was made available in August 2007 as a PDF file. Its conversion to 
a text file for editing means that some of the formatting has been lost. The substance of the 
report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original PDF file is held on record. Text 
in [ ] is editorial. 
 
Cover letter 
To: Chief of Operations, UNMACA Kabul 
CC: Deputy Quality Control Manager UNMACA Kabul 
From: Area Manager UNAMAC South 
Date: December 03, 2006 
Sub: DEMINING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT 
Enclosed please find the investigation report of mine accident occurred to [National demining 
agency] deminer MCT-09 during the clearance operation in Minefield No 24/2404/0811193 in 
Haji Bashar village, Dand district of Kandahar province on 26th November 2006. 
For further information please refer to the attached documents. With best regards, 
 
Investigation Report of Mine/UXO Accident/Incident  
Within the Ground of Demining 
Date of report: 26 November 2006 
Date of accident: 26 November 2006, 11:30 am 
Accident/Incident Location: Haji Bashar, Dand District, Kandahar Province 
GR: WGS 84, E 065 55 05.2; N 31 22 53.9; GPS 
Device caused the incident/accident: POMZ AP fragmentation mine 
The mine was detonated on Deminer while searching the soil which backhoe prepared, with 
the small shovel.  
During the excavating of soil, which prepared (removed soil during the preparation by 
backhoe) by backhoe the mine was setoff. The deminer has pulled the bushes which were 
removed by Backhoe from the actual place and the visible wires were connected to the 
bushes it could be trip wires but the deminer has pulled it carelessly the accident has 
occurred.) 
Description of the accident: 
According to [the Victim] deminer that he was searching (removing the soft soil) which 
backhoe has prepared with a small shovel and he pulled out the bush where barbed wire 
existed, while he pulled the bushes suddenly an accident occurred. 
He got injury to finger of his left hand (fractured), and superficial injury to his left shoulder and 
injuries to his right thigh above knee. 
 
History of the Minefield: 
2 
The minefield is located in Haji Bashar village, Dand district of Kandahar province, which, is 
an uneven open area with light bushes, the area, is contaminated with Russian AP blast and 
fragmentation mines for the security of the airfield and most probably contaminated with ERW 
during the last war. 
Task has been technically surveyed by [Specialist national survey agency] on 21, May 2001 
and clearance of the above-mentioned task has started on 16 March 2002 by MCT-03 & 9 of 
[National demining agency], and on 31 July 2003 suspended due to lack of resources. Team 
has cleared around 23107sqm and during the clearance found 123 AP mines (PMN, PMN2) 
and 161 different types of UXO. 
Clearance of the task has restarted on 2nd September 2006 by MCT-9. 
The Victim wore PPE but it was not effective. 
Site conditions: The terrain was uneven and open. The soil was soft and dry. The weather 
was clear and mild. The vegetation was light bushes. 
Team Operation outlook: Last refresher/revision course was on 04 November 2006, (One day 
in Class and the second day in field practically). The team had been at the site for 39 days 
only 2 sections were working in this task and the other (2) sections of the team were working 
in other task adjacent to this task. The working hours are 07:30 up to 13:30. In the minefield 
deminers are changing every 30 minutes and the out going deminers are on rest [they work in 
two-man teams]. The climate has an average 18 centigrade. The detector in use was the Mil 
D1. The hand tools were the bayonet and small size shovel (folding). According to the Team 
Leader and Section Leader the deminer had properly worn PPE, but victim's injuries shows 
improper use of PPE (no apron) and working with the wrong sitting position. The last period of 
leave was on 3rd of November 2006. 
Medical reaction time: Time to Paramedic was on the accident site: 2 minutes. Time of 
Paramedic starting treatment to the casualty: 2 minutes. Time for ambulance to drive 43 km 




Supervision: The section leader, ATL and team leader did not closely monitor the deminer 
during excavation on the backhoe’s prepared soil (seems Deminer was not wearing full PPE 
and was working in an unapproved prodding position). 
The visible wires and bushes were already clear signs for the team leader and section leader 
to maintain a very close and strict supervision of the parties.  
Training: Pulling out the bush which is connected with the barbed wires in the field shows 
that deminer did not understand how to deal with such an area. He was insisting in his 
statement that he did the right job (pulling the bush). Furthermore, it is unclear whether there 
was a proper brief between the changing deminers and the victim's predecessor. 
Sitting position of the deminer shows that he did not practice according to SOP during the 
excavation or removing soil from the area. 
The pulling of the bushes and wires shows the de- miner's carelessness and poor technical 
skill.   
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Careless[ness] of victim: Deminer has not operated in approved prodding/excavation 
position (injuries to his left shoulder shows working in a side position). The Deminer has not 
worn full PPE with apron (as he has got injuries to his thigh).  
Proper use of Procedure: The deminer has not used full PPE with apron while he was 
working on a signal (prodding/excavation). 
 
Recommendations 
1. The command group of the team have obligation to control and guide their subordinates 
(deminers) during field operations especially while they are doing prodding, excavation and 
pulling. 
2. Deminer should fully brief his successor during each change process about the 
specifications of each area (clearance Lane) and they should consult each other regularly. 
3. Deminers are to wear full PPE while entering to operational area. 
4. All deminers are to work on a signal with an approved position. 
5. The deminer should never touch and pull bushes and any suspected wires without 
instruction of command group (immediate supervisor). 
6. A refresher training with a focus on prodding, excavation, pulling and use of PPE should be 
provided to the team members. 
 
Attachments: [Held on file.] 
[Over-exposed and photocopied pictures showed long apron PPE with small blood spots 
(implying that it was worn), a small thumb, index and forefinger injury on the left hand, a small 
fragment in the inner thigh, 15cm above the knee, a small injury inside the left forearm and a 
small fragment on the left shoulder (which would have been exposed if the deminer had been 





Date: December 18, 2006 
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To: See distribution list 
From: Acting Chief of Operations UNMACA, Kabul 
Subject: Follow up action on de-mining accident happened to the deminer of [National 
demining agency] MCT-09 in task # 193 of Haji Bashar village, Dand district of Kandahar 
province 
Reference: Demining investigation report dated: December 03, 2006, of UN-AMAC Kandahar. 
A demining accident happened on November 26, 2006, at 11:33 in task # 24/2404/0811193 of 
Haji Basher village, Dand district of Kandahar province, a POMZ mine exploded on [the 
Victim] the deminer of MCT-09 of [National demining agency], causing fracture/injury to his 
left finger, superficial injuries to his shoulder and minor injuries to his right thigh. 
Contributor factors to the accident: 
Lack of supervision by command group: as the deminer was not supervised and 
controlled during his operations in removing the ripped soil of MDU and bushes with a small 
folding shovel, and pulling the bushes with his hand not using tripwire feeler prior to pulling 
bushes, as a result the wire had been pulled and the accident occurred. The type and position 
of injuries are indicating that he did not wearing full PPE and was working in a not approved 
prodding position. The visible wires and bushes were the obvious signs for the command 
group to maintain a very close and constant supervision of the deminers and also to make 
sure that they are wearing PPE and conducting safe methods. 
Lack of training: pulling out the bushes which are connected to barbed wires showing that 
the deminer did not understand on how to deal such an obstacle, as he insisting in his 
statement that he did the right job. Further more the setting position of deminer shows as he 
did not practice according to the SOPs during excavation and removing of soil from the ripped 
ground of MDU. 
Carelessness/not proper use of procedures: as the deminer was not operating in 
approved prodding/excavating position (injuries to his left shoulder show working in a side 
position and pulling of bushes without using tripwire feeler. 
Recommendations: 
i. The [National demining agency] operations should ensure that a proper management of the 
task is carried out while using combined method of clearance. 
ii. The command group of the team should pay full attention to the activities carried out by 
each individual deminer during the clearance operations and ensure the a) proper usage of 
safety equipments, b) proper demining tools are being used and c) practicing standard and 
safe procedures according to SOPs. 
iii. The deminers should not touch and pull bushes and any suspected wires without 
instructions of command group. 
iv. The deminers should brief their successors during each changing process. 
v. All deminers should work on signals using approved position. 
vi. A refresher training to be held for the team members with focus on prodding, excavation, 
pulling and use of PPE. 
The feedback of [National demining agency] is needed as NL than the end of December 
2006. Regards, 
5 
Distribution List With attachment: AMACs (5), Sub AMAC Gardez, Director [National demining 
agency] 
Less attachment: [All demining groups working in country.] 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 729 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: 22 Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: 29 minutes 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron, Long 
visor 





COMMENT: See Medical report. 
 
Medical report 
“fracture/injury to his left finger, superficial injuries to his shoulder and minor injuries to his 
right thigh.” 
Casualty detail: [ID removed.] DoB: 1984: From IMSMA sketch. Right side above knee; upper 
limbs: lower limbs. 
[Over-exposed and photocopied pictures showed  a thumb, index and forefinger injury on the 
left hand, a small fragment in the right inner thigh, 15cm above the knee, a small injury inside 
the left forearm and a small fragment on the left shoulder.] 
CASUALTY REPORT  
SERIAL NUMBER: ( 1900 ) 
[Much of it illegible.] 
L. Hand fingers Deep Injuries + L. Shoulder & R.Femur injuries 
“We cleaned and washed all injured wounds and dressed them. We splinted fracture bone.” 
 
STATEMENTS 
Statement and Witness Report 1: Team Leader 
Date: 27/11/06 
Question.1: Please introduce yourself? 
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Answer. 1: I am [Name removed] leader of 3rd section, team No.09 (C) site [National 
demining agency]. 
Question. 2: What were you doing when the accident happened? 
Answer. 2: I was controlling and monitoring my parties. 
Question. 3: What have you carried out after the accident? 
Answer. 3: Prior to every thing I instructed to my parties, to stop the activities, and to closed 
staff to extract the injured deminer, and I immediately passed on the information to the 
assistant of team and as well as to the team leader. 
Question. 4: Deminer has explained against one of our question "that" he had pulled up 
bushes from littered area with a shovel" that resulted in explosion, according to your 
understanding, the action has the deminer carried out is correct? 
Answer. 4: So, for pulling up the bushes, isn't proper way. 
Question. 5: The visible trip wires, and similar to barbed wires and bushes, existed on the 
ground, what was your instruction to the deminer for demining activity? 
Answer. 5: The bushes that hampers activities, should be cut with scissors slowly, and the trip 
wires after the searching, to be disconnected with a cutter, and there for I always give the 
mentioned instruction to the deminers. 
Question. 6: In spite of PPE, deminer has injured in his left shoulder and right knee, describe 
the cause please? 
Answer. 6: Wounded part of the shoulder is not covered by PPE, and right knee, which is 
shallow wounded, possibly the apron of PPE rolled down to one side. 
Question.7: Prior to the accident, what was your operational action in relevance to the trip 
wires and bushes existed in the field? 
Answer. 7: Previously when we encountered bushes, they are pulled out through a Backhoe 
machine, adversely we didn't face any trip wires. 
Question.8: In accordance to your understanding which actions were to be applied in order to 
preventing accident? 
Answer. 8: If deminers were denied pulling out the bushes till the arrival of the Backhoe 
machine we would displace the soil with the backhoe and that was possibility of the 
prevention of the accident. 
Question.9: Hasn't you instructed to the deminer on the above-mentioned way, or he himself 
refused the instruction? 
Answer. 9: yes I have instructed the deminer on the mentioned way and the deminer 
accepted the instruction but mistakenly he did the action. 
Question.10: Has you applied any other ways for the clearance of the field are you satisfied of 
the work of deminer? 
Answer. 10: Yes, we applied a Backhoe and I'm satisfied of the work of the deminer. 
 
Statement and Witness Report 2: the Victim 
Date 27/11/06 
Question.1: Please introduce yourself? 
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Answer. 1: I am [the Victim] deminer of section three.  
Question. 2: What were you doing when incident happened? 
Answer. 2: I was pulling out the soil through a shovel that was carried out by a Mechanical 
Machine. 
Question. 3: In accordance to your understanding what kind of thing was exploded?  
Answer. 3: POMZ was exploded. 
Question. 4: What did you do that caused incident? 
Answer. 4: When I pulled up the bushes, incident happened. 
Question. 5: Is the action you carried out, properly? 
Answer. 5: Yes, I think the action I have carried out is properly. 
Question. 6: Are you allowed, to pull out a tripwire or any thing else look like a trip wire? 
Answer. 6: No I am not allowed. 
Question.7: Was the section leader or team leader aware of the existence of the bushes and 
wires? 
Answer. 7: The section leader and team leader were not aware of the wires, adversely they 
were aware of the existence of the bushes. 
Question.8: Did you get permission of the section leader, pulling out the bushes?  
Answer. 8: No, I did not get permission of the section leader, to pull out the bushes, but during 
that time wires were invisible. 
Question.9: Pulling of the bushes and trip wires by hands are dangerous aren't they?  
Answer. 9: Yes, pulling out the bushes and trip wires by hands is dangerous. 
 
Statement and Witness Report 3: Team Leader 
Date 27/11/06 
Question.1: Please introduce yourself? 
Answer. 1: I am [Name removed] team leader for the team # 9 of site (C) of [National 
demining agency]. 
Question. 2: What were you doing when incident happened? 
Answer. 2: I was supervising my two sections related to task #163, in order to collect red and 
white marks, after the completion and checking of the mentioned task when explosion went 
off. 
Question. 3: What have you done after the accident? 
Answer: 3: 1 transmitted the information to FMU team, and then passed on the information to 
office, to be aware of the accident and for the conduct of optional and last action to be carried 
out. 
Question. 4: Please explain the accident in details? 
Answer: 4: The accident happened at 11:30 am on 26/11/06 upon [the Victim], that injured left 
hand first three fingers, left shoulder, and right knee, and then I took the pictures. 
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Question: 5: Was the PPE used in a proper way, if yes why the deminer has wounded his 
shoulder and knee? 
Answer: 5: We have not been working with out PPE, and we are not allowed to work with out 
wearing PPE, I think the deminer pulled out the bushes from his one side after the work out 
by a backhoe. 
Question: 6: Deminer has explained in one of our question "that he had pulled up bushes 
from littered area with a shovel" that resulted in explosion, actually according to your 
understanding, the action has the deminer carried out is correct? 
Answer: 6: When the deminer sees bushes and wires, should not pull out them, seeing these 
items he should aware his section accordingly, and those wires and bushes should be cut, or 
pulled out with the consultation of the section, in order to identify the danger, and we have the 
proper instruments, which we are cutting the bushes to not hamper the activity of the deminer, 
and to work on a proper and correct way. 
Question: 7: Are you satisfied of the acceptance of the instruction you give to the deminer, 
and his work out? 
Answer: 7: I've never seen any problem in his work, concerning the current work he did, we 
are dissatisfied of his work, why he did so. 
Question: 8: According to you, what was the cause of the accident? 
Answer: 8: I the cause of the accident was, bushes that have pulled out, and maybe he was 
thinking that, the bushes are being turn out by a backhoe, and there is no any thing left and 
connected to the bushes. 
Question: 9: I accordance to your understanding, which actions were to be applied, in order to 
preventing the accident? 
Answer: 9: for the prevention of the accident, the deminer seeing the bushes and the wires, 
might inform the section leader, and after the consultation of the team leader, he would be 
able to conduct optional actions, such as pulling out the wires, with occurring no accident. 
Question: 10: Are you satisfied of the technical knowledge of the deminer and as well as from 
the technical knowledge and monitoring of the section leader? 
Answer: 10: Yes, we are satisfied of the technical knowledge of the deminer and as well as 
from the technical knowledge and monitoring of the section leader, but the mistake the 
deminer made, makes me dissatisfied. 
Question: 11: Are you satisfied from the work of the backhoe in the field?  
Answer: 11: Yes, we are satisfied from the work of the backhoe; it does work in accordance to 
the rule and procedures. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the 
investigators determined that the Victim was working in an unapproved manner and his errors 
were not corrected. The frontal apron used is extended, but the Victim did not keep it between 
himself and his work. He may well have been side-on to the detonation because the tripwire 
ran to a mine that was not in front of him. This would explain the shoulder injury. The inner 
thigh injury is hard to understand if the apron extension was being worn. 
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The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training” because the investigators determined 
that the Victim thought he was working appropriately when the accident occurred. 
The accident may have been caused by the failure of the mechanical preparation to be 
consistent. It seems that the backhoe is normally used to rake out the light bush and move it 
around, pulling any tripwires and detonating mines in the process.  
The point of initiation was probably underground, so limiting the spread of fragments and 
allowing the Victim to escape with relatively minor injuries.  
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